I. MODEL
Consider a population of asexual haploid individuals. Initially there are N total individuals, randomly assigned into M groups. For simplicity, let us suppose that each individual's group identity is visible to everyone else and can be recognized perfectly. Let G i ∈ {1, · · · , M} denote the group identity of an individual i. The behavioral (conditional) strategy of the individual i can be described by a pair of variables (p i , q i ), 0 ≤ p i , q i ≤ 1. Herein p i and q i represent the individual i's preferences towards in-group members and out-group members respectively.
In this work, we focus our study on individual helping behavior, a widely discussed example of cooperative behaviors. An individual using strategy (p, q) cooperates with the in-group with probability p while cooperating with the out-group with probability q. In-group favoritism means p > q, namely, preferential treatment to in-group members. In our model, the ratio of benefit to cost, b/c, is fixed for all individuals. This means that any pairwise helping behavior has the same synergistic effect per unit cost. It is noteworthy that our model can be easily extended to study any type of game interactions with continuous mixed strategies (p, q). Individuals can even play different games within and between groups. In the theoretical analysis we provide a general framework for studying such "in-group/out-group" evolutionary processes.
We consider well-mixed populations where individuals are equally likely to interact with everyone else. Such pairwise all-to-all interactions, however, are weighted and differentiated by the similarity/difference of bilateral group affiliations. Furthermore, the game is only one shot, and there is no high-order social norm at work. At each evolutionary update event, an individual's total payoff P i , accrued through pairwise interactions with all others once, determines its reproductive fitness. We express the effective payoff as an exponential function of the total payoff, i.e., f i = exp(βP i ), where β is the intensity of selection [1] .
In this paper, we study two models: one is focused on the evolutionary dynamics in homogeneous populations consisting of in-group cooperators (p, q) and defectors (0, 0); the other is focused on the emergence of in-group favoritism in heterogeneous populations with continuous individual strategies (p i , q i ) distributed over the unit square, [0, 1] 2 . We detail both models in the following.
A. Basic model of two discrete strategies
In this model, we study the competition between in-group cooperators (p, q) and unconditional defectors (0, 0). We adopt a frequency-dependent Moran process (i.e., birth-death process) for the evolutionary dynamics [2, 3] . At each time step t, an individual i is selected for reproduction proportional to its effective payoff f i . One offspring is being reproduced that replaces another individual randomly selected from the entire population (including the parent itself). Thus the population size N is constant over time. The newborn inherits the parent's strategy with probability 1 − u; otherwise, with probability u it mutates to a random strategy, either (p, q) or (0, 0).
Migration occurs right after the reproduction phase. With probability v the newborn migrates to a randomly chosen group out of the total M groups. Otherwise, it stays within the parent's group with probability 1 − v. Because of this asynchronous updating, there are overlapping generations.
Here we describe reproduction in terms of genetic evolution. An alternative description of cultural learning (e.g., imitation dynamics) is quite straightforward. In addition to agent-based simulations, we shall provide an analytical condition for strategy (p, q) to be favored over (0, 0) by selection in the long term mutation-selection equilibrium.
B. Coevolutionary model of continuous strategies
We also consider stochastic evolutionary dynamics of individual preferences (p i , q i ) in heterogeneous populations. Initially, each individual's strategy is drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit square. The game interactions are the same as stated above. The population system is updated according to the frequency-dependent Moran process. At each time step, an individual is chosen to reproduce proportional to its effective payoff f i . Its offspring replaces another randomly chosen individual from the population (including its parent). Reproduction is, however, subject to mutation. Individual migration between groups can be seen as some kind of mutation process of group memberships, which is independent of the strategy mutation events. With probability v, migration of the newborn occurs; the offspring randomly chooses to affiliate with one of the total M groups. Otherwise, it stays within the parent's group with probability 1 − v.
The offspring inherits the parent's strategy (p i , q i ) with probability 1 − u. Otherwise, it adopts a novel strategy with probability u. Here we consider both local and global mutation models. In the local mutation model, the offspring's strategy is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with the parental value as mean and with a small standard deviation (= 0.01 in our case). In the simulations, we use a truncated Gaussian distribution within 2 standard deviations away from the mean value, and guarantee that all (p i , q i ) values are constrained in the unit square. We also study the global mutation model, in which the strategy of a mutated offspring is uniformly and randomly drawn from the unit square.
C. Methods
For weak selection (β ≪ 1), we can analytically calculate the evolutionary dynamics using coalescent theory [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . For strong selection (large β values), we have to instead rely on extensive computer simulations.
In our simulations, at each time step, we first calculate each individual's fitness according to the current population composition, and then update the population (including migration and mutation events) as aforementioned. This updating process is repeated for a sufficiently long period. The frequency of strategies is averaged over more than 10 6 time steps per individual. We focus our investigation on the resulting stationary distribution of strategies in the long-run mutation-selection dynamics.
In the basic model, our analysis is focused on the critical b/c ratio, above which in-group cooperators (p, q) are more abundant than defectors (0, 0). To do this, we fix the benefit of cooperation b = 1 and vary c. We simulate the evolutionary process for a series of c values from less to more than the theoretical threshold, with equal interval 0.01 in between. In theory, the equilibrium frequency of cooperators (y-axis) decreases linearly with increasing c values (x-axis) under weak selection. At a certain c cooperators become less abundant than defectors. Because of the stochasticity in finite-sized populations, we need to do linear regression to the data points obtained by simulations. The intersection of the best linear fitting line and the horizontal neutral line (at 1/2)
gives the critical b/c determined by numerical simulations.
In the coevolutionary model, there are infinitely many continuous strategies. In order to practically determine stationary distributions of strategies, we virtually discretize the strategy space by chopping it into a grid of size 50 × 50. At each evolutionary update, we count the number of individual strategies falling into each grid cell. Averaging these quantities over more than 10 9 time steps, we obtain desirable statistics of the stationary distribution by simulations. It should be noted that under this discrete setting, the average frequency of all strategies is 1/2500 = 4 × 10 −4 .
II. ANALYTICAL THEORY
Here we present an analytical theory of our models in the limit of weak selection. For generality, let us consider competition of n strategies (n ≥ 2) in the mutation-selection dynamics. Let A = {a i j } be the n × n payoff matrix, where a i j is the payoff of an i-th strategy playing against a j-th strategy. Denote by x i the frequency of i strategy (i = 1, 2, · · · , n), ∑ n j=1 x j = 1. For notational simplicity, let us now assume that the average total number of interactions between strategy i and j is given by I i j . Then the payoff of an individual playing strategy k is P k = ∑ j a k j I k j /(x k N). The fitness (i.e., effective payoff) of an individual k is given by f k = exp(βP k ). The total population fitness is ∑ k N x k f k , where N is the population size. Evolutionary updating occurs according to a frequency-dependent Moran process [3, 8] . In an update event, the average change of x k due to selection can be written as:
For weak selection, the above equation can be linearized in the leading order of β:
Averaging above change over all possible population states, we can obtain the expected change in the stationary state in the leading order of β (from now on let us omit higher order of β):
According to the perturbation theory developed in Refs. [6] [7] [8] , in the limit of weak selection the average ⟨·⟩ can be taken over the stationary population state in the neutral evolution where β = 0.
On the other hand, the average change of x k due to strategy mutation is given by
Thus the total expected change ∆x tot k in the mutation-selection equilibrium is:
It follows that the stationary frequency ⟨x k ⟩ is given by:
We say natural selection favors strategy k if its abundance is greater than 1/n in the stationary state. We thus obtain the condition for strategy k to be favored by natural selection is
Following prior work [8, 9] , we can simplify the calculations by the symmetry condition. As for the case of neutral evolution, different strategies act like different colors of individuals, index permutations do not bring in any changes. Accordingly we need to consider only five cases: 
we can greatly simplify the condition (6) as:
where, up to the same positive constant factor, these λ's are proportional to:
We should note that the condition (7) generally holds for a wide class of evolutionary processes under weak selection, and that the λ formula (8)-(10) hold for evolutionary processes where individuals globally compete to reproduce offspring and either the birth rate or the death rate is constant (that is, the total payoff from the game can only affect either the birth rate or the death rate, but not both) [9] . Tarnita et al. also prove that the ratios of these λ i values (that is, λ 1 /λ 2 and λ 3 /λ 2 for λ 2 0) do not depend on the number of strategies n [9] .
A. In-group/out-group evolutionary dynamics
In the present model, the payoff of strategy k, (p k , q k ) playing against strategy l, (p l , q l ), depends not only on their strategy, but also on the similarity/difference of their group memberships. We therefore must distinguish two dividing cases: individuals using strategy k and l belong to the same group, or they are from different groups. We can write the payoff matrix A as
. . , M} is the group identity, and δ(G i , G j ) = 1 if G i = G j , otherwise being zero. The superscripts 'i' and 'o' denote in-group and out-group game interactions respectively. In this way we can separate the payoff matrix A and the associated λ i parameters into two parts:
which are associated with the payoff matrix A i = {a i i j }, and
which are associated with the payoff matrix A o = {a o i j }. Then the condition in Inequality (7) can be extended to such "in-group/out-group" evolutionary processes with six structural coefficients. The strategy (p k , q k ) for the in-group and the out-group games is favored by selection, if and only if:
We remark here that there is one population structure, but the structure itself implies two different games, one for in-group interactions and the other for out-group interactions, leading to two sets of structural coefficients (three each).
Let us further interpret these λ parameters. To this end, let x 
It should be noted that due to symmetry the average number of interactions between the same strategy should be doubly counted. That is how we obtain the above equations. Henceforth we omit The former means the probability of finding two strategies i and j in the same group, while the latter means the probability of finding two strategies i and j in different groups. Substituting these quantities into Eqs.(11) (12), we have
and
We interpret these correlations as follows. Let us randomly pick up three different individuals. The
is the expected probability that two of them are in the same group (resp. different groups) and have the same strategy, while the third one has a different strategy; the
is the expected probability that two of them are from the same group (resp. different groups), and all three have different strategies;
is the probability that the first two of them have the same strategy, different from the third one's, and the latter two are in the same group (resp. different groups). To avoid double counting, we must bear in mind that, for example, the actual value of ⟨x k x l i x l i ⟩ should be divided by n(n − 1). We will come back to this issue in the subsequent calculations.
We should note that the averages of these triplet correlations result from counting individuals with replacement, while here they are interpreted/computed by sampling three different individuals. Taking this difference into account only brings in a correction term of order 1/N [6, 7] , which can be safely neglected when population size N is large.
B. Correlations at neutrality
We can analytically calculate these triplet correlations using the coalescent theory described in Refs. [5] [6] [7] [8] . It is convenient to compute in the continuous time limit, τ, by rescaling the discrete time τ = 2t/N 2 . In this new time scale, we need to rescale the mutation probability u and the migration probability v as well. Thus for the Moran process, we obtain the rates µ = Nu and ν = Nv respectively. The key idea of coalescent theory is tracing two individual lineages back in time. After some certain steps, we can always find their most recent common ancestor. Intuitively, these two lineages "coalesce" backward in some time τ 2 , where τ 2 is called the coalescent time.
The coalescent time density of τ 2 is given by
Similarly, we can obtain the coalescent time density function p 3 (τ 2 , τ 3 ) for three randomly chosen individuals. In this case, either two of them coalesce first back in time τ 3 , and then this lineage coalesces with the remaining one back in time τ 2 . We have
We have two identical individuals (i.e., they have the same strategy and are in the same group)
immediately after the coalescence of the two chosen lineages. It is worthy of noting that each lineage mutates with rate Nu/2 = µ/2 and the migration along each lineage happens with rate Nv/2 = ν/2. Furthermore, we can treat individual migration between groups as a kind of 'group membership' mutation process, which is independent of behavioral strategy mutation events. If at least one strategy mutation occurs along the two lineages after their coalescence, the two individuals have the same strategy with probability 1/n. Similarly, if at least one migration event happens along the two lineages after their coalescence, the two individuals are still in the same group with probability 1/M. Taking these into account, we get the probability that for two randomly chosen individuals, they still have the same strategy (are in the same group) after their coalescent time τ 2 , respectively:
To derive the probability s 3 (τ 2 , τ 3 ) that three randomly chosen individuals all have the same strategy after their coalescent time τ 2 + τ 3 requires a bit more but similar work. This has already been done in Ref. [8] :
Taking into account the order of coalescent events for triplets, we now can calculate the pair/triplet correlations in the following:
The factor 1/n in the right hand side of above equations accounts for the probability of randomly selecting an individual with strategy k. In the neutral evolution, this probability is given by 1/n.
By symmetry, we can have other correlations calculated as follows:
where for the first two quantities we use
Omitting the intermediate calculation steps, we present the λ terms associated with ingroup games:
Analogously, we calculate the λ o i associated with out-group interactions as follows. The probability z 2 (τ 2 ) of two randomly chosen individuals having different groups since their coalescent time τ 2 is given by:
) .
Then we can calculate the following pair/triplet correlations:
We should note that, as mentioned before, the factor 1/[n(n − 1)] in Eq. (41) takes into account the fact that there are n(n − 1) different combinations of the strategy index satisfying i j.
We can also have the following correlations calculated by symmetry:
We finally arrive at the explicit expressions of λ o terms for out-group interactions:
We can further simplify these six λ expressions altogether by canceling out their greatest com-
Finally we can have the simplified λ expressions as follows.
For in-group interactions,
and for out-group interactions,
We can see that these λ expressions indeed do not depend on the number of strategies, but are jointly determined by the number of groups, the mutation rate, and the migration rate.
III. THEORETICAL RESULTS
Having these six structural coefficients λ's at hand, we now can readily apply this theoretical framework to analyze in detail the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of in-group favoritism. We would also like to stress the broad applicability of our framework in studying other social behaviors that can be invoked by minimal group construction. Taking an illustrative example, we shall also study the evolution of parochial altruism, where individuals tend to help members of their own groups but also express aggression towards members of different groups.
A. Two discrete strategies
Specifically, let us consider the simple case of two strategies for both the in-group game (A versus B) and the out-group game (A ′ versus B ′ ). In the following, we derive the condition for strategy (A, A ′ ) to be favored over strategy (B, B ′ ).
Suppose the payoff matrix A i for the in-group game is given by:
and the payoff matrix A o for the out-group game is given by:
If A (A ′ ) is a cooperative strategy and B (B ′ ) is a defective strategy, then we have
Using Inequality (13), we arrive at the simplified condition for (A, A ′ ) to be favored over (B, B ′ )
as follows:
where the cofficients k i 's and k ′ i 's are given by:
Substituting the λ expressions calculated above and canceling out the common factor, we obtain the explicit expressions for k i 's and k ′ i 's:
For low strategy mutation µ → 0 and large number of groups M, we have
We see that the in-group game can promote cooperation (k 1 > k 2 ), but the out-group game always opposes cooperation (k 
We now specifically consider the evolutionary dynamics of two competing strategies in our model: S 1 = (p, q) and S 2 = (0, 0). An individual using strategy S 1 cooperates with probability p and defects otherwise with probability 1 − p if the opponent is from the same group (in-group);
whereas it cooperates with probability q and defects otherwise with probability 1−q if the opponent is from a different group (out-group). The strategy S 2 never cooperates. In-group favoritism implies 1 ≥ p > q ≥ 0. According to the general condition presented above, we can derive the condition for strategy S 1 to be favored over S 2 .
To this end, the payoff matrix for in-group games is
The payoff matrix for out-group games is
Thus we have for in-group games:
And for out-group games:
FIG. S1: 3-Dimensional plots of the condition C(p, q) in inequality (69) for different games. Parameters: It follows that strategy S 1 = (p, q) is favored over S 2 = (0, 0) if and only if:
where these λ parameters are the same as derived before. The above condition can be seen as a quadric surface over the strategy space (p, q) (see Fig. S1 ), and only strategies S 1 = (p, q) that render positive C(p, q) are selected against S 2 = (0, 0) (see Fig. S2 ).
For notational simplicity, we can rewrite the above condition as:
where r i 's are given by:
We make the following observations. For three special cases p = 1 and q = 0 (in-group cooperation), p = 0 and q = 1 (out-group cooperation), and p = q = 1 (unconditional cooperation), we have r 1 = r 4 and r 2 = r 3 . In these cases, the condition in inequality (69) can thus be simplified to the single σ condition [10] :
And the σ values for these three cases are respectively given by
Note that for p = 1 and q = 0, the interaction structure of the population recovers to the sets model [7] , and σ(1, 0) is the same as in Ref. [7] . For p = 1 and q = 1, the population becomes well-mixed, leading to σ(1, 1) = 1 as in Refs. [3, 10] Whereas for general p and q values, we find that r 1 r 4 and r 2 r 3 due to their nonlinear dependence on p and q. Thus we still need three independent structural coefficients to characterize the inequality condition as presented in (56).
Concerning the simplified 'benefit-cost' prisoner's dilemma, we have
and P = 0. Thus we arrive at the following condition for in-group cooperators S 1 = (p, q) to be favored over pure defectors S 2 = (0, 0):
Substituting the calculated λ expressions to above inequality, we arrive at the explicit, analytical condition for natural selection favoring (p, q) over (0, 0):
We should note that under no condition could out-group cooperators (i.e., 1 ≥ q > p ≥ 0) outcompete defectors.
When in-group cooperators abstain from helping out-group members (i.e., q = 0), they have the greatest chance to prevail. The critical b/c ratio becomes
On the other hand, when cooperators do not discriminate against out-group members (i.e., p = q), they never have a chance to dominate the population. The critical b/c reaches infinity since the situation is recovered to a standard well-mixed population where no in-group favoritism is at work.
B. Continuous strategies
In our coevolutionary model, we consider continuous strategies (p, q) over the unit square.
Under some certain circumstances, in-group favoritism (that is, high in-group helping level, p, and low out-group helping level, q) can be most favored by natural selection in the long run mutation-selection equilibrium. To gain analytical insights, here we consider a global mutation model in which a mutated offspring adopts a strategy uniformly and randomly drawn from the unit square. In our computer simulations, we also consider a local mutation model, where a mutated offspring chooses a strategy from a Gaussian distribution with the parent's strategy as mean and with a small standard deviation. While we find no qualitatively different results, local mutation causes the stationary distribution of strategies more condensed than global mutation does.
Using the same approach conceived in Ref. [11] we can generalize the above results for n discrete strategies to the scenario of continuous (infinitely many) strategies. In this limiting case, the sums in the condition can be replaced by integrals. Thus a strategy p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) ∈ U n is favored by natural selection if and only if:
Here the λ i terms are the same as for the discrete strategies, and A(p, q) is the payoff of strategy p playing against strategy q.
As for the present model of in-group favoritism, we need to separate in-group and out-group interactions as aforementioned. Denote strategy i by s i = (p i , q i ). For generality, here we can also interpret p i (resp. q i ) as the probability of cooperating with in-group (resp. out-group) members.
For the simplified prisoner's dilemma, p i and q i can be seen as the in-group/out-group helping level respectively. The payoff of strategy i playing against strategy k within the same group or from a different group is respectively given by
Let us calculate the condition for strategy s = (p, q) to be favored by natural selection. To this end, the three integrals in Eq. (82) for in-group interactions can be given by:
The three integrals in Eq. (82) for out-group interactions can be obtained by replacing p by q in the above equations. The λ expressions are the same as in the discrete n strategies. We arrive at the final condition for natural selection favoring strategy (p, q):
It is easy to find that C(p, q) always equals zero at the point (1/2, 1/2) if the payoff matrix satisfies the condition of 'equal gains from switching' (i.e., R + P = T + S ) [12] . In this case, the strategy (1/2, 1/2) is neutral for any parameter choices.
For the simplified b-c parameter prisoner's dilemma, C(p, q) is just a linear function of (p, q) over the unit square:
We can thus visualize the function C(p, q) as a hyperplane in three-dimensional space (see Fig. S3 ).
Let us consider these strategies located in the four corners: (0, 0), defection, (0, 1), out-group cooperation, (1, 0), in-group cooperation, and (1, 1), unconditional cooperation. We find that 
Interestingly, this condition is exactly the same as in the case where only these two discrete strategies are present and competing with each other. We can further prove that this is true only when the original 2 × 2 payoff matrix between two strategies satisfies the condition of 'equal gains from We can further divide the unit square into two regions by the critical line C(p, q) = 0, which can be formally written as q = K(p − 1/2) + 1/2. The slope K is determined by the model parameters:
In the (p, q) plane, strategies below this critical line are favored by natural selection, while being suppressed above the critical line. A positive K > 0 requires the same condition as given in Eq. (87), suggesting that in-group cooperation (1, 0) is most favored by natural selection and thus most abundant in the long-run mutation-selection equilibrium. Moreover, we find that the maximum slope K is +1 when the benefit-to-cost ratio, b/c → ∞, and that the minimum K can reach −∞ when the migration rate ν tends to 0.
We further identify the condition for the population average p to be larger than the average q.
Up to the same common factor, we can calculate the averages ⟨p⟩ and ⟨q⟩ as follows:
The condition for ⟨p⟩ > ⟨q⟩ is equivalent to:
Interestingly, substituting the above condition into the expression of the slope K in Eq. (88), we find a very simple condition for ⟨p⟩ > ⟨q⟩ in terms of the slope K: Let us now look at the low mutation limit µ → 0. At this limit, the slope K becomes:
And the difference between population averages p and q is given by:
Hence ⟨p⟩ − ⟨q⟩ > 0 requires
Since (M − 1)ν(2 + ν) is positive and b, c are also positive, we can formally write the above condition as:
It is easy to find that this condition is exactly equivalent to K > −1.
Note that the numerator in the above inequality (96) could be negative if
For instance, for large number of groups M and the migration rate
is fulfilled. In this case the selection of some in-group favoritism, i.e., ⟨p⟩ > ⟨q⟩, is always guaranteed for any b/c ratio.
C. Heterogeneous interaction rates
In the analysis above, we consider uniform interaction rates within and between groups (i.e., everyone is equally likely paired up with one another to play games). We can further modify this assumption and take into account heterogeneous rates for individuals' in-group and out-group interactions. To do this, we introduce an additional model parameter, θ ∈ (0, 1), which is the proportion of time per updating step that a focal individual interacts with in-group members. For θ > 1/2, individuals interact more often with members of their own group than with those of other groups; for θ = 1/2, the original model is recovered; for θ < 1/2, individuals are biased toward out-group interactions rather than in-group interactions. Varying the parameter θ changes the relative payoff contribution from in-group games versus out-group games.
It is straightforward to see that the strategy selection condition (85) now is a weighted sum of in-group and out-group contributions and thus is modified as
)]
where the structural coefficients λ's are the same as before. For the simplified b-c prisoner's dilemma, we obtain the condition for natural selection to favor strategy (p, q):
Again we find that the (p, q) strategy space is intersected by the critical line, q = K
where
K and K is the original slope as given in Eq. (93). Strategies below this line are favored while those above this line are suppressed. Since θ 1−θ > 0, the condition for evolution of maximum in-group favoritism is the same as in the original model:
The condition for evolution of some in-group favoritism becomes
After some algebra, we can further show that: if K > 0, we have ⟨q⟩ < 1/2 < ⟨p⟩; if
, ⟨p⟩ < ⟨q⟩ < 1/2. Moreover, ⟨q⟩ always increases with θ; whereas ⟨p⟩ is an increasing function of θ if K > 0, but decreases with θ if K < 0.
D. Local mutation model
Based on above calculations, we can also analyze the local mutation model using an approach analogous to the adaptive dynamics [13] . Suppose the resident population uses strategy s = (p, q).
Now a mutant strategy s
Without loss of generality, we assume one mutation at a time. The long-run competition between s and s ′ is determined by the condition C(s ′ , s) in the left hand side of Inequality (7). To calculate this, the payoff matrix for the mutant strategy s ′ regarding in-group interactions is
The payoff matrix for the mutant strategy s ′ regarding out-group interactions is
Now consider a mutant strategy s ′ arises in the infinitesimal neighborhood of the resident strategy s. In this limit, the gradient of the function C(s ′ , s) with respect to s ′ , evaluated at the resident strategy s, gives the most likely evolutionary adaptation in which a mutant s ′ sufficiently close to s has the largest chance of invasion success. This yields the following deterministic differential equations for the most likely path of mutant invasion:
Omitting intermediate calculation steps, we obtain the explicit differential equations as below:
We can see thatq < 0 always holds, while the sign ofṗ is positive if and only if:
which is exactly the same as inequality (87). Natural selection always disfavors the tendency to help out-group members (Fig. S5) . Only when the above inequality holds, does selection promote the predisposition of helping in-group members; otherwise, the pure defection corner (0, 0) is most selected (Fig. S5) . It should be noted that we get the same results if using the gradient of the condition C(p, q) in inequality (85) for strategy (p, q) against all mutants over the entire strategy space.
E. Co-evolution of cooperation and aggression
In this paper, the theoretical framework for "in-group/out-group" evolutionary games can be easily extended to study a variety of social behaviors that are triggered by minimal group construc-
tion. Here we demonstrate the omnipotence of our analytical theory by studying the co-evolution of cooperation and aggression. Previously, we have focused on the positive side of social behavior -individual helping behavior biased towards in-group or out-group. Let us now consider both 'in-group love' and 'out-group hatred' as what follows. termed as 'parochial altruism' in Refs. [14, 15] , is most selected.
As discussed previously, the condition C(p, q) is also a linear function of p and q because both payoff matrices A i and A i satisfy the condition of 'equal gains from switching'. Moreover, because of the global uniform mutation and the particular payoff matrices used, (1/2, 1/2) is always a zero of the condition C(p, q), and thus it is neutral for any parameter choices. Let us focus on the four corners. We note that C(1, 1) > C(1, 0) and C(0, 1) > C(0, 0) require the same condition:
And C(1, 1) > C(0, 1) and C(1, 0) > C(0, 0) also imply the same condition:
Hence the strategy (1, 1), i.e., parochial altruism, is most favored by selection if and only if above two inequalities are both fulfilled. Figure S6A shows an example, where both conditions are fulfilled and thus the most common strategy is parochial altruism. It should be noted that in Ref. [14] the authors questioned the validity of evolutionary multilevel selection theories based on group conflicts and some individual selection models for explaining their experimental observations of parochial altruism in humans. They also called for further theoretical efforts for explicitly examining the interactions between individuals stemming from different groups in evolutionary models. Since selection in our model operates only on the individual level and we consider both in-group and out-group interactions, our analytical results here make good progress towards understanding the evolution of parochial altruism [14, 15] .
IV. SIMULATIONS
In addition to the theoretical analysis, we have performed extensive agent-based simulations to validate our analytical predictions as well as to study the evolutionary dynamics under nonvanishing selection strength.
A. Two discrete strategies: (p, q) versus (0, 0)
We present a systematic study of the evolutionary dynamics between two discrete strategies, frequency of cooperation monotonically decreases with increasing β. Figure S10 shows that the frequency of cooperation is always a monotonic decreasing function of cost of cooperation c for different mutation rates u. This result also evidences the emergence of cooperation as a result of a tradeoff between two opposing forces -selection and mutation. In other words, we observe a "crossover" of cooperator abundance with increasing u. For small c values that favor the evolution of cooperation, increasing mutation rate u brings down the cooperation level. Whereas for large c values that are disadvantageous for cooperators, increasing mutation The number of groups M plays a decisive role in determining the evolutionary fate of cooperators. As shown in Fig. S12 , the larger the number of groups, the greater the chance for cooperators to prevail. In excellent agreement with simulations, the critical c/b ratio, below which cooperators win over defectors, increases monotonically with the number of groups M until a plateau is reached (Fig. S12A) . For other parameters fixed, increasing number of groups M also boosts the abundance of cooperators (Fig. S12B ). This result suggests the importance of the diversity of group identity in the maintenance and promotion of cooperation.
B. Coevolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations
We have run extensive agent-based simulations for both global and local mutation models. As shown in Fig. S13 , the simulation results and our analytical theory are in perfect agreement. To have a clear picture, here we show the stationary distributions of these strategies that are selected (namely, their abundance is larger than the average 4 × 10 −4 ). We can see that the critical lines in the strategy space determined by simulations agree very well with the theoretical predictions (Fig. S13 ). In comparison with the global mutation model, local mutation results in more condensed distributions of strategies (Fig. S15) . Additionally, localized mutation reduces the fluctuations in the stationary distributions and thus renders the distribution of strategies smooth. We can clearly observe a peak in these distributions. In the theoretical analysis, we have demonstrated that both global mutation and local mutation models require the same condition for maximum in-group favoritism (1, 0) to be most selected. Our simulations confirm this prediction (Fig. S15) . We also study the effect of increasing β on the resulting distribution of strategies. We observe the qualitatively same pattern as in the global mutation (cf. Figs. S13A, S14 and Fig. S15 ). Taken together, the present work shows that our results in the main text are robust with respect to various model variations. 
